Freeenterpriseland | Thoughts & Commentary

The question in the headline has a clean answer in theory and a messy one in practice. In theory, an agency can revisit a waiver decision. In practice, the answer depends on which instrument the agency uses, which forum it chooses, and whether the waiver is characterized as a “rule” at all. The 2025 fight over California’s clean-car waivers is a case study in that distinction. The retrieved record does not support a story about stranded financial bets. It supports a narrower and more useful story about procedural vehicles.

This article works from the documents that could be retrieved. Where a source was unavailable, that is stated. Where a claim comes from a party-advocacy document, it is attributed as such. The goal is not to resolve the merits. The goal is to show how a reader who works from primary documents should track a waiver action.

What the record actually shows

The most complete dated record available is the Harvard Environmental and Energy Law Program’s regulatory tracker for corporate average fuel economy and greenhouse gas standards. It is a secondary source, but it supplies dated entries with case citations that can be checked against primary filings. From that tracker, the 2025 sequence runs as follows.

On March 6, 2025, the Government Accountability Office issued an opinion that EPA’s notices of decision on the California waivers are not rules and therefore not subject to the Congressional Review Act (EELP tracker, entry dated March 6, 2025). The Senate Parliamentarian reached a similar conclusion: because the waivers are not rules, they should not be subject to the CRA (EELP tracker, entry dated May 22, 2025).

The Senate proceeded anyway. On May 22, 2025, the Senate passed H.J. Res. 87, nullifying EPA’s waivers for California’s clean vehicle programs under the CRA. The House had already passed the measure (EELP tracker, entry dated May 22, 2025). The tracker describes the Senate’s decision not to follow the Parliamentarian’s guidance as “an unusual occurrence in the history of the Senate.”

On June 12, 2025, the same day the President signed three CRA resolutions disapproving California’s Clean Air Act preemption waivers, California and ten other states sued. Their complaint argued that the federal government “ran roughshod over federalism and separation of powers principles in applying the CRA to these three preemption waiver decisions” (EELP tracker, entry dated June 12, 2025, citing California v. EPA, N.D. Cal., No. 3:25-cv-04966).

The dispute did not end there. In June 2026, EPA submitted four additional California clean car rule waivers to Congress for review and possible repeal under the CRA (EELP tracker, entry dated June 12, 2026). On September 2, 2026, a federal judge granted California’s request for a preliminary injunction preventing EPA from reclassifying four Clean Air Act waivers as rules subject to the CRA and directed the administration to “take all necessary steps … to restore the status quo” before the June 2026 reclassification (EELP tracker, entry dated September 2, 2026, citing California v. EPA, No. 1:26-cv-02185 (D.D.C.)).

The instrument matters more than the outcome

Read those entries in sequence and a pattern appears. The substantive goal was consistent: undo California’s clean-car waivers. The instrument changed. The first route was CRA resolutions. The second route was reclassification of waivers as CRA-subject rules. Both routes depend on the same threshold characterization: is a waiver decision a “rule”?

That question was contested before the Senate voted. GAO said no. The Senate Parliamentarian said no. The Senate voted yes. A court later suspended the reclassification track. None of this resolves whether the underlying waivers should stand. It does show that the procedural characterization is where the leverage sits.

For a reader who works from documents, the lesson is concrete. When an agency acts on a waiver, identify three things before reading the merits:

• The instrument. Is this a CRA resolution, a Clean Air Act withdrawal, a denial of a waiver request, or something else? Each has a different legal basis and a different review path.
• The forum. A CRA resolution runs through Congress. A CAA withdrawal runs through the agency and then the courts. The forum determines who can challenge the action and on what grounds.
• The characterization. Is the waiver decision treated as a “rule”? If yes, the CRA applies. If no, it does not. That single word controls the procedural vehicle.

A contrast case: voluntary withdrawal is not disapproval

The record contains a useful contrast. In a January 14, 2025 letter to the California Air Resources Board, EPA’s acting administrator wrote that CARB had withdrawn its authorization request regarding portions of the Commercial Harbor Craft regulation on which EPA had not acted. EPA stated it was “taking no further action on the CHC authorization request (88 FR 16439 (March 17, 2023)) and considers this matter closed” (EPA letter, Jan. 14, 2025).

That is a different mechanism from a federal disapproval. In the CHC matter, the state withdrew its own request. In the 2025 clean-car matter, Congress disapproved the waivers over the state’s objection. A reader who conflates the two will misread the procedural posture. Voluntary withdrawal closes a matter. Imposed disapproval creates a challenge.

What the advocacy documents say, and what they do not

The American Fuel and Petrochemical Manufacturers published a FAQ on California’s Advanced Clean Cars II regulation. It describes ACCII as requiring an increasing share of new vehicle sales to qualify as zero emission over model years 2026 to 2035, until only new zero emission vehicles can be sold, with a small share of plug-in hybrids allowed (AFPM FAQ). It also argues that EPA is required to deny waiver requests if California’s rules fail certain Clean Air Act criteria, and asserts that ACCII does (AFPM FAQ).

Those are positions, not findings. AFPM is a trade association representing fuel and petrochemical manufacturers. Its FAQ is advocacy. A reader can quote it as a party position and pair it with the dated procedural record. A reader should not treat it as a neutral statement of statutory criteria. The same discipline applies to any trade-association or advocacy document in a waiver fight.

What the record does not show

Several things that a reader might expect are not in the retrieved record. The Federal Register text and citation of the 2025 EPA action disapproving California’s waivers could not be retrieved. The EPA waiver page and Federal Register search returned access errors. The text of the three 2025 CRA resolutions as enrolled was not retrieved. The GAO opinion and the Senate Parliamentarian’s determination were not retrieved in primary form. The California v. EPA complaint and the September 2026 preliminary injunction order were not retrieved directly; they are cited through the EELP tracker.

That matters for anyone modeling exposure. The “stranded bets” framing in the original topic is not supported by any retrieved source. No retrieved document shows investor losses, stranded capital, or market moves tied to the revocation window. Those claims are omitted here rather than softened. If such data exists, it would need to be documented before it could be used.

A practical reading method

For any waiver action, start with the instrument. Pull the enrolled resolution or the Federal Register notice. Identify the statutory basis. Then check the threshold characterization: does the document treat the waiver as a rule? If the answer is contested, look for the GAO opinion, the Parliamentarian’s guidance, and any court order addressing the question. Those documents, not press releases, determine the procedural path.

Then check the forum. A CRA resolution is a congressional action. A CAA withdrawal is an agency action. The review path differs. A court can suspend a reclassification track, as the September 2026 preliminary injunction shows. That does not resolve the merits. It changes the timing and the risk.

Finally, separate the dated procedural record from the advocacy documents. The tracker entries give dates and case citations. The AFPM FAQ gives a position. Both are useful. They are not the same kind of evidence.

FAQ

Did EPA revoke California’s clean-car waivers in 2025?

The retrieved record shows that Congress disapproved the waivers through CRA resolutions, and that the President signed three such resolutions on June 12, 2025 (EELP tracker). The Federal Register text of any EPA withdrawal action was not retrieved. The instrument used in the 2025 sequence, per the record, was congressional disapproval, not an agency withdrawal rule.

Can an agency take back a waiver?

The record shows two routes were attempted: CRA resolutions and reclassification of waivers as CRA-subject rules. Both were contested on the threshold question of whether a waiver decision is a “rule.” GAO and the Senate Parliamentarian said no. The Senate proceeded anyway. A court later suspended the reclassification track. The merits remain unresolved in the retrieved record.

What is the difference between a voluntary withdrawal and a disapproval?

In a voluntary withdrawal, the state withdraws its own request and the agency closes the matter, as in the January 14, 2025 CHC letter. In a disapproval, Congress or the agency acts over the state’s objection. The procedural posture and the litigation risk differ.

Where can I find the primary documents?

The EELP tracker supplies dated entries and case citations. The EPA CHC letter is available as a PDF on EPA’s site. The Federal Register text of the 2025 actions and the enrolled CRA resolutions were not retrieved for this article and should be pulled directly from the Federal Register and congress.gov before relying on them.